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The present paper argues that our understanding of the resilience of
social-ecological systems can be improved by considering “communicative resilience”
based on Communicative Systems Theory, which focuses on communicative action
oriented to achieving mutual understandings. It further argues that it is possible to
theorise and analyse resilience within complex social-ecological systems from this
communicative perspective in a way that is very different from, but complementary
to, agent-based approaches focussed on incentives. The paper presents data from
multispecies mixed fisheries in Europe to demonstrate that the implications of
institutional rules for SES resilience can be understood and improved upon by
examining how institutions help or hinder the development of mutual
understandings.Introduction
In recent years there have been a number of exciting theoretical developments around
the idea of the resilience of social-ecological systems (SES). Many are inspired by theories
of complex adaptive systems in both natural science and economics (for instance
Holland 1992; Miller and Page 2007). Using agent-based approaches they illuminate
SES by analysing the relationships between institutions, the strategies that emerge
from the incentives and norms of agents, and ecological systems (Folke 2006;
Ostrom 2005, 2007). However, while resilience theorists recognizes the importance
of the characteristics of communication, especially in the form of collective learning
(Armitage 2005; Folke 2006; Wilson 2002) systematically theorized communicative
approaches in resilience thinking are lacking; a major reason being the difficulty of
developing such approaches within an agent-based framework.
This paper helps address this lack by examining science-policy “boundary objects”
using Habermas’ (1987) communicative systems theory (CST). We suggest that
“communicative resilience” is an essential part of “social–ecological resilience”. We
illustrate the approach through a discussion of one complex type of SES: multi-spe-
cies, mixed fisheries (MSMF). The paper begins with a description of the MSMF
problem, then outlines the theoretical approach, and finally describes research based
on communicative resilience that examines two types of boundary objects that have
been important in MSMF in Europe. The conclusion suggests communicative resilience
can be improved by not trying to reduce discussions of complex systems to simple
categories designed for institutional convenience.2013 Wilson and Jacobsen; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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A multispecies fishery refers to fisheries where more than one species is vulnerable to
being caught. In many cases a multispecies fishery is also a mixed fishery, meaning that
more than one combination of fishing vessels and gears are being used. Mixed fisheries
generally involve four major kinds of actors. The fishing industry is very diverse but
generally holds maintaining long-term sustainability as a strategic goal while facing
short-term pressure to cover operating costs. Conservation ENGOs wish to protect
marine environments, biodiversity and sustainability. To some degree managers’ incen-
tives match both of the other main groups when it comes to conservation objectives;
they are interested in both profits and sustainability and, sometimes biodiversity. Scientists
are called upon to provide advice on ecological conditions on which policies will be built.
MSMF are managed by a varied array of measures. The two most basic approaches
are ‘input’ control over the amount and type of fishing activities and ‘output’ control
over the amount of fish caught. In Europe the two main systems for implementing
these are referred to respectively as ‘effort management’ and ‘quota management’. Effort
management makes it hard to transparently divide fishing opportunities among fishers
or countries. Fishers also quickly find ways to catch more fish with a given effort, a
problem called ‘effort creep’. However, effort management has weaker incentives for
discarding unwanted fish because a vessel may land whatever fish it catches in its allot-
ted time. Effort is also not necessarily applied to a specific fish stock and this simplifies
scientific monitoring and estimations of fish abundance.
Quotas are an amount of fish, so they are easily divisible and the relationship between
quotas and catches is in principle direct. Quotas, however, are based on a total allow-
able catch (TAC) that must be defined based on a fairly precise estimate of how many
fish are available to be sustainably caught from a particular stock. These estimates can
be especially difficult in MSMF because of biological interactions among species and
the data complexities that arise from having many different fleets and gears catching
fish. All quota systems face problems with discarding fish, for example to bring higher
quality fish to market. In MSMF an important driver of discarding is catching fish that
a fisher does not have a quota for or that is otherwise protected. Discarding also creates
data problems because discarded fish are not recorded. Quota management has historically
been based on a common pool quota given to a fishing fleet, but more recently
granting an individual quota (IQ) to fishers has become popular. These systems
eliminate economically inefficient and dangerous practices such as racing to fish a
common quota. When made freely transferable (ITQ) the market will allocate fish
with the highest economic efficiency among management alternatives (Hannesson, 2004).
MSMF management has evolved in complex ways. In Japan the strategy selected was
to control effort, through reductions in licenses, shortening seasons and imposing clo-
sures. The emphasis was on the simplicity and effectiveness of these measures com-
pared to a quota system within a large coastal fishery (Nagaski and Chikuni, 1989).
Effort creep nullified the effectiveness of the input controls (Yagi 2001) so a quota sys-
tem was introduced for several major species in 1997. Managers were still concerned
about the scientific accuracy needed for a quota system, and an effort approach was
retained for some stocks. The New England groundfish fishery in the USA experienced
serious decline in important stocks as early as the 1960’s. The first generation of mea-
sures combined input and output control, introducing catch quotas, minimum fish size,
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limits. Direct limitations on both catch and fishing effort came in 1994–1995 with a
range of new measures including individual stock TACs for five stocks and an aggre-
gated TAC for seven others. Recently sector management has been introduced. This
involves self-organising groups of fishers who enter into a contractual relationship with
management in which they develop their own plans to fish sustainably for a total
allowable catch based roughly on their individual histories. These contracts then excuse
them from some other restrictions, including the days-at-sea effort control system.
Countries using ITQ systems have addressed the discarding problem in several ways,
all of them complex and multilayered. In Canada vessels are required to have a quota
for any species they might catch and discarding is banned with some few exceptions.
The larger vessels carry observers on board but discarding remains a problem on smal-
ler vessels (Rescan and Wilson 2009) because fishers find it easier to dump than to go
through the complex system of trading for the quota they would need to legalise their
catch (Caddy & Agnew 2004). In Canada and New Zealand temporary closures of areas
with high discards are used to back up the discard ban. This measure has led to more
selective fishing (Branch and Hilborn 2008), as fishers seek to avoid the automatic clo-
sures resulting from an exhausted cod quota (Caddy & Agnew 2004). New, inexpensive
surveillance technologies are increasingly being used to monitor fishing activities at sea.
Sanchirico et al. (2005) review how ITQ systems in MSMF in five countries have
addressed the general problem of balancing catches with allocated quotas. The key is to
give fishers the flexibility to work within the system. They found that it was helpful to
have multiple instruments in place to give fishers different ways to match quotas and
catches. All the systems required ongoing changes and elaboration in response to eco-
logical and economic conditions (Sanchirico et al. 2005). In addition to effort and quota
control, management also makes use of myriad technical measures and protected areas.
ITQ systems help address the allocation problem, but systems based on strong property
rights are also problematic from the viewpoint of cumulative effects because they are a
poor fit with measures that decrease the value of quotas. Murray et al. (2010) argue
that the relentless accumulation of management measures brings about a loss of flexi-
bility and the erosion of community.Theoretical approach
Resilience thinking is rooted ideas about complex adaptive systems (Holland 1992) first
developed in ecology. Berkes et al. (2003) suggest that resilience has been defined two
basic ways in ecology. The first defined resilience as the ability to return to this steady
state. More recently the focus has been on how a once stable ecological regime, i.e. a
particular structure of ecological processes, can change into a new stable regime. Resilience
is defined as the magnitude of the disturbance needed for such a change. They, along
with others (Folke 2006; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Low et al. 2003) emphasize
that resilience thinking is a step away from an equilibrium concept of systems to-
wards one that assumes change and seeks to explain stability. Redundancy, homo-
geneity, diversity and adaptability are commonly associated concepts as in, for
example, Folke’s (2006) argument that poor management results in reduced resilience when
landscapes become homogenized and more vulnerable to disturbances.
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as Adger’s (2000) “the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses
and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change” (347) being
common. Too often theorizing social resilience has been muddied by analogies from
natural ecology (Wilson 2010). Capacity for adaptive social learning is perhaps clearest
dimension of social resilience found in the literature and great emphasis is placed on it
by Armitage (2005), Berkes et al. (2003), Gunderson and Holling (2002), Hahn et al.
(2006), and Wilson (2002) among many others.
By seeing society and its material basis as a set of interconnected systems ecological
and social resilience can be thought of as aspects of SES resilience. Both kinds of resilience
depend on one another, but one cannot assume that one guarantees the other (Folke 2006).
Folke (2006:259) cites Carpenter et al. 2001 in respect to three core ideas within SES
resilience: “(1) the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain
within the same state or domain of attraction, (2) the degree to which the system is
capable of self organization (versus lack of organization, or organization forced by
external factors), and (3) the degree to which the system can build and increase the
capacity for learning and adaptation. “Central to the argument in this paper is the
idea that adaptive processes result from a system’s self organization (Folke 2006,
Norberg and Cumming, 2008) and, hence, “the concept of resilience in relation to
social–ecological systems incorporates the idea of adaptation, learning and self-
organization in addition to the general ability to persist disturbance” (Folke 2006:259).
Using a version of CST inspired by Habermas (1987; 1991), and further developed
elsewhere (Wilson and Jentoft, 1998; Wilson 2003, 2009a), we offer the concept of
“communicative resilience” as the part of the resilience of SES that makes adaptive so-
cial learning possible. We define communicative resilience as the degree to which
people within an SES are able to express themselves by drawing on the full range of
background understandings that allow communication to be meaningful. We argue that
many institutions, i.e. the shared cognitive, normative and regulative understandings
that maintain stable patterns of social interaction (Wilson and Jentoft, 1998), systematically
restrict such expression. These restrictions can and do inhibit social learning by blocking
the criticism and/or contextualization of understandings of the social or ecological
environment.
If any institution is going to maintain a stable pattern of behaviour it must simultaneously
coordinate two often contradictory kinds of interaction: strategic action in pursuit of
actors’ objectives and communicative action for developing mutual understandings
of situations. “Mutual understanding” is not agreement; it means that participants’
perceptions of a situation are close enough for responsive interaction to occur.
Agent-based theories of institutions, while recognising the importance of communication,
conceptualise it as one more strategic resource available to the agent (Ostrom 2005). For
example, Ostrom et al. (1994:33) consider ‘the way actors acquire process, retain,
and use knowledge, contingencies and information’ to be one of four key characteris-
tics of an actor. CST, in contrast, focuses on the conditions of communication at the
institutional level.
CST considers communication through the contrasting logics of the 2nd person
(you and I communicate with each other) and 3rd person (I/you/he/she observe a
system of communications) perspectives. The “mutual” in “mutual understanding”
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communication”. Habermas’ famous ideal speech situation, that there is “no manipulation
involved in the communication; and that everything communicated is open to question
about its validity” (White 1988, 56), expresses such standards. The power of these coun-
terfactual ideals derives from the fact that during 2nd person interaction we use them to
evaluate communicative actions. Mutual understandings, even in situations of differential
power, require an element of persuasion. Your boss can tell you what to say and do but
he or she must persuade you to think something is actually true. These standards guard
access to what Habermas calls the “lifeworld”, the background of shared meanings –
language, culture, socialization – that make communication possible.
Rational communication also requires that claims be oriented toward types of mutual
understandings. For example, a claim of fact is oriented toward consensus about its
truth; a claim of value is oriented towards an agreement about the rightness of its general
applicability, and a claim of interest is oriented towards possible compromise. These
orientations are background assumptions in communication that help us make
sense of what is being said. An illustration is that if someone says “let’s just split the
difference” in respect to interests this makes perfect sense, but saying the same
thing in respect to facts is at best an admission that the facts are unknown.
The 3rd person perspective is utterly different. From this perspective we begin with
the question of strategy. When we observe the communicative system from the 3rd per-
son we often see persuasion as a veneer over manipulation or draw attention to how
the voices of the powerless have been silenced. As social scientists seeking to under-
stand a discourse we look at how people link facts, values and interests, not at how they
keep them rationally separate. It is this huge difference between the logic of the 2nd
and 3rd person perspectives that is the heart of CST.
To relate these two perspectives CST takes an entirely different angle from agent-
based approaches and describes social systems in communicative terms. The 3rd person
view of mutual understanding begins by observing the social-psychology of building
and reproducing institutions at the small group level. We account to each other for
what we do and say and these accounts iteratively reproduce patterned social inter-
action. Scott and Lyman (1968:46) tell us that accounts ‘shore up the timbers of frac-
tured sociation’ and observe that ways of accounting for behaviour become routine
within subcultures and groups. The ethnomethodologists showed through repeated ob-
servation and experiments that norms and rules do not so much provide a cookbook
for action as the language of accounting for behaviour after the fact (Heritage 1984).
Weick (2001) describes how organizations faced with new situations act first and make
sense out of their actions later. Competing accounts of reality are the material of stra-
tegic action in the communicatively conceived social system.
CST develops the systemic aspects of the 3rd person perspective through the idea of
“generalized communications” which reconceptualises as mechanisms of communica-
tions those dynamics most closely associated with social power. Prestige and influence
are generalized communications that contribute to mutual understanding through pre-
understandings about whose voices will carry the most weight. They operated in highly
lifeworld-dependent institutions such as science or communities. Markets, private bur-
eaucracies, and governments, however, make heavy use of money and authority,a gener-
alized communications that Habermas (1987) calls “steering media”. Money and
Wilson and Jacobsen Maritime Studies 2013, 12:1 Page 6 of 18
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/12/1/1authority create mutual understandings while shortcutting communications dependent
on the lifeworld. Steering media do this in a mechanical and automatic fashion facili-
tated by a nearly complete marginalization of the lifeworld. Authority requires access
to the lifeworld only to create an understanding of to the content of the order, the
related sanction and the recognition of a condition that triggers the order’s application.
One can use money to buy a soda in a place where one knows nothing of the language
or culture, the needed mutual understanding is automatically provided. Steering media
are critical to institutions that operate on higher scale levels and/or require more pre-
dictable outcomes. For steering media to operate some form of coercion or pressure
must be in place to replace the persuasion that the vastly reduced access to the life-
world makes no longer possible. This coercion must refer to some objective reality. For
example you cannot get the soda without paying, and the existence of the soda must
also be verified. More relevant to the discussion at hand, authority requires a verifiable,
legal “rule condition” (Ostrom 2005), to support its ability to replace the richer com-
munications lifeworld access makes possible.
In institutions where steering media are the primary mechanisms of communication,
accounting becomes formal accountability focussed on these objective realities. The
contrast of the two perspectives is important here. What we call “objectivity” from the
3rd person is the same condition of sanctioned reality that we refer to as “transparency”
from the 2nd person. The scientific method that we rely on to produce objective facts is
nothing but a set of procedures for making knowledge as transparent, i.e. as verifiable
by the community at large, as possible (Wilson 2009a). Accountability is not possible
without this dual condition. To hold people accountable we must see what they have
done. This duality means that accountability acts as a sort of lubricant between the
often contradictory goals of strategic actions in pursuit of interests and communicative
actions in pursuit of mutual understandings. If certain fish stocks are to be avoided in
an MSMF what is required is both a commitment by the fishers to selective fishing and
evidence that selective fishing actually taking place, without both of these in place the
attempt to create a new pattern of behaviour will grind to a halt.
Within environmental management these objective realities are increasingly ‘boundary
objects’. Boundary objects are such things as models, indicators, environmental
action plans and joint research products that focus discussions across the boundary
of science and policy (Cash et al. 2002). In complex SES, developing mechanisms for
accountability almost always involves science because of the complexity of human
activities and of monitoring their impacts on ecosystems. When a boundary object is
working it pulls together concepts that are acceptable to the various parties involved
in its development. In complex SES, the elements of institutional grammar that
Ostrom calls “conditions,” are often boundary objects. Conditions are the ‘variables
that define when and where an institutional statement applies’ (2005:149). From the
CST perspective these are the objective referents that authority depends on to short-
cut the lifeworld.
The need for objective rule conditions means that institutional imperatives heavily
sway the content of boundary objects often resulting in less access to the lifeworld for
both scientists and stakeholders seeking to raise questions. This is because in complex
SESs, environmental managers often seek boundary objects that give simple messages
with little nuanced content even when the science is complex and/or uncertain. An
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by inserting rich textual explanations of data and analysis below the tables where TACs
are reported, but the European Commission has no good way to use this textual infor-
mation and so must simply adopt the reported number (Wilson 2009a). Rule condi-
tions have to be created even under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. The
threat is that, once in place, a rule condition can be reified into a new “objectivity” that
stands beyond effective contextualizing, questioning or explaining and hence is not ob-
jective because it is not transparent. Rule conditions anchor a steering medium that
works by marginalizing the lifeworld, i.e., the same communicative resources that are
needed to generate the critiques, nuances and caveats that allow a rich reflection of the
realities in the social and natural environment. Institutions that are crucial to the resilience
of SES are grounded by science/policy boundary objects that are used to literally
truncate meaning itself – including meaning needed for accurate science. No institution is
more dependent on full lifeworld access than science. Theories rooted in a 3rd per-
son perspective have noted the creation of scientific “black boxes” but have depicted
them as the result of strategic interactions (e.g. Latour 1987), something that can
only illuminate aspects of the particular forms the boundary objects take. From the
2nd person perspective within CST it is the shortcutting of the lifeworld that seals
the box around science/policy boundary objects.
CST’s 2nd person perspective opens up the possibility of the amelioration of these
problems through institutional design. This is what communicative resilience adds to
the overall resilience of SESs. The mixture of generalized and rational communications
found in institutions is variable and can be changed by design. More rational communi-
cations allows the communication of richer and more nuanced pictures of both eco-
logical and social situations. It is the foundation of social learning, the self-organization
and adaptation of social institutions.
Once understood, CST is a coherent description of social reality, it is rooted in
everyday experience and some of its tenants have survived systematic tests (Wilson
1998). However, if communicative resilience based in CST is going to be useful for
diagnosing problems and informing institutional design then it must offer a
methodological approach rooted in the 2nd person, 3rd person distinction that is
central to the theory.
Standard social science methods can be used to alternate between the perspectives to
build up a picture of the central diagnostic question: the impact the 3rd person communi-
cative system is having on the 2nd person lifeworld. Qualitative, in-depth interviews and
focus groups, when correctly carried out, straddle the 2nd and 3rd person. The interviewer,
who is seeking to understand the subjective experience of the respondent, listens and
questions while evaluating statements through the screen of rational communications.
But the discussion itself is oriented to the 3rd person because what is being asked is a de-
scription of the SES of interest. This output is subjected to a discourse analysis; a 3rd per-
son exercise that maps the way facts, interests, and values are linked in discursive themes
while trying to minimize the question of the validity of the claims being made. Then insti-
tutional factors that are blocking claims people wish to make can be identified. The first
case study below of an MSMF boundary object stops at this point.
However, as the second case below demonstrates, quantitative methods used to
understand the subjective viewpoints of respondents through various sorting exercises
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tionship between the two perspectives by rendering respondents’ 2nd person perspec-
tives into comparable forms. The elements being sorted are usually statements of facts
or value but they can also be physical or natural objects. They must emerge from the
discourse analysis and not from some a priori theory. Kapasa et al. (2005), for example,
using Q sorts and consensus analysis, show that Zambian fishers who use a type of gear
that, without scientific confirmation, is considered “destructive” tend to have both the
highest levels of local ecological knowledge and are the most likely to hold opinions
that are contrary to a strong consensus agreeing with the ecological opinions and pol-
icies of the local Department of Fisheries. Their use of illegal gear, however, blocks their
full participation in the local fisheries co-management programme. In another example
Wilson (2010) combines agreement with statement sets and social network analysis.
The degree to which pairs of respondents agree with each other about science while
disagreeing about policy is used as a measure of rational communication. The analysis
found that the only network pairs having higher agreement on science than policy were
fellow members of a fisheries co-management committee.
The boundary objects case studies that follow seek to apply CST through this same
set of methods.Boundary objects in European multispecies mixed fisheries
This section draws on field data to explore two kinds of boundary objects in European
MSMF. The two are nearly opposites in terms of the role played by the boundary
objects in the creation of rule conditions. Recovery plans for depleted stocks are sets of
various legal acts and their discussion as observed here rarely touched on specific rules.
The definitions of fisheries and fleets, however, are directly used as the basis of both
scientific models and management rules. The field data comes from the observation of
nine working groups of European fisheries scientists and three meetings of Regional
Advisory Council (RAC) working groups. RACs are stakeholder fora on which both the
fishing industry and conservation ENGOs sit. The three RACs included here are the
North Sea, Baltic and Southwest Waters RAC. The RACs’ remit is to provide advice on
fisheries management to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Marine
Affairs and Fisheries (DGMARE). In addition to observing meetings, interviews were
also carried out with fishers in 12 fishing ports, six fisheries scientists, five government
fisheries managers and three focus groups. All of these were in-depth, open ended
interviews. The port interviews also included a pile sorting exercise to see how fishers
classify vessels. Information from a short email questionnaire done with twelve RAC
members is also used.
Recovery and long-term management plans
This set of boundary objects involves scientists, managers, conservation ENGOs and
the fishing industry. The first recovery plan began in February 2001. Initially they were
sets of emergency measures, but general guidelines came in 2004. While individual
measures are legally enacted, recovery plans are not a single legal act. A general stake-
holder consensus supports the plans. However, this shared ideal of seeking the recovery
of a stock leaves many issues of disagreement in the details. In spite of these differences
in details and emphasis, even this broad, symbolic consensus has proven important
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agenda, especially in the RACs (Wilson 2009b).
The following is from a public talk by the Director of Conversation Policy at
DGMARE early in the process of recovery plan development. The focus is on the scien-
tific input into the process of developing recovery plans:
Q1. What do we need for such recovery plans? As they will normally contain targets
for recovery or long-term management, usually expressed in terms of biomass, we
need clear precautionary and limit reference levels for the stocks concerned. They
will also contain harvest rules; that is rules for the fixing of TACs over several years
. . . [later in the document]. It means a concentration of resources, at least in the
short term, on the analysis of the most depleted fish stocks (Farnell 2003).
For DGMARE recovery plans are strategic mechanisms that are used to concentrate
fisheries management capacity on a subset of the most serious problems with depleted
stocks. There is an emphasis on biomass targets and the precautionary approach (PA).
Two central questions about the recovery plans are their relationship to long-term
management plans (LTMPs) and effort management. Q2 presupposes a rather smooth
movement from recovery plans to long-term management plans (LTMP) based on har-
vest control rules (HCRs). These are rules in a form ‘for Y condition X change in har-
vesting pressure is required’ and are one of the aspects of LTMPs that all stakeholders
see as useful for differing reasons. The following is unequivocal about LTMPs while
being more circumspect about effort management:
Q2. Interviewer: So, you see the recovery plans as sort of a starting point for a
general reform, a general move towards effort management and long-term
management? Commission Administrator: Certainly to long-term management; to
effort management in justified cases. I think it's clear there won’t be a general
signing up to effort management as the normal, or as a normal instrument for
fisheries management, but I think there is recognition that we will need to manage
effort in order to make particular efforts to stop the serious degradation of the stock
collapses.
The movement from recovery plans to more general long-term planning is a priority
for the fishing industry. The following is from a member of an industry RAC member:
Q3. [LTMPs] remove political interference in the process of setting allowable catches
by removing the ability of Member States to question the output given that the plan
would have been agreed through Council. The output is clinical and precautionary
thus affording greater security to the stocks.
Recovery plans are to be driven by technical considerations through HCRs. For the
industry an important aspect of this is reducing uncertainty in business planning and
stability of supply.
Some members of the industry see positive outcomes from the recovery plans be-
cause they provide a way of contributing their knowledge about technical conservation
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from responsible fishing. However, both the industry and the ENGOS were engaged
late in the process. A RAC staffer described them as “sprung upon” the industry based
on an “ICES philosophy”. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) is an independent multilateral organisation. It produces the official scientific
advice for fish stocks in the northeast Atlantic and adjacent seas and DGMARE is its
biggest client. Recovery plans were initially developed by DGMARE and ICES and then
presented for comment. In the development of science – policy boundary objects
scientists are not seen as simply neutral facilitators no matter how hard they may try to
keep their role as doing science but not management. The failure to involve stake-
holders early limited the range of their responses. For one thing, the plans were already
based on individual fish stocks as their basic unit, while the industry wanted this unit
to be fisheries and the ENGOS wanted a more ecosystem-based perspective. A RAC
staff member:
Q4. We had a really important meeting where we laid down our ideas for long-term
management plans, and the most important thing that came out of that was that it
was the fisheries that the plans ought to relate to, not the stocks. Now, that's been
diluted since, whenever we discuss management plans with the Commission they
still try to refer to stocks.
Of course, many fishers simply do not agree with the recovery plans. The industry
sees both scientists and managers as interpreting the precautionary approach too nar-
rowly in the development of the plans. Many in the industry felt that if they had been
included earlier in the process then the objectives would have been more realistic. They
echoed the classic MSMF complaint about protecting one threatened stock by limiting
access to all the others:
Q5. Industry RAC Representative: Opportunities to take other species in a mixed
fishery are lost when a so called recovery stock is taken. The abundance of cod
makes it almost impossible for cod to be avoided and thereby additional days to
catch other species are lost.
Conservationists also strongly support the move towards a longer term approach.
One conservationist RAC Member argued that the LTMPs being developed are im-
proving under adaptive management and developing them for all stocks should be a
priority. Conservationists are also link the recovery plans to a more ecosystem-based
approach to management.
Q6. Conservationist RAC Member: It appears that a requirement to protect/restore
ecosystem functioning is missing from the current application, and this must be
incorporated into processes in the future, if recovery is to be successful.
Perhaps the greatest challenge the Commission faces as it tries to develop recovery
plans is that, particularly in their long-term aspects, these plans are not a clean fit with
official EU fisheries decision-making. The actual legal decisions are made year-by-year
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of long-term plans.b This includes the kinds of if ‘X condition then Y action’ HCRs that
would avoid short-term political decision-making.
The discourse analysis on recovery plans reveals a number of ways that access to the
lifeworld was enhanced or reduced by institutional factors. The legal complexity and
ambiguity allowed the stakeholders to discuss the plans while avoiding conflicts over
specific rule conditions. This meant that the emerging RACs were able to use recovery
plans as a critical part of inventing themselves as stakeholder fora that attracted on-
going participation from the fishing industry and ENGOS and meaningful attention
from the Commission. Other institutional factors limited lifeworld access. The exclu-
sion of the industry and ENGOs from the early development of the recovery plans
limited the issues they were able to raise effectively when they did get involved. The
premising of the recovery plans on individual fish stocks led to the definition of the
MSMF problem as simply an expanded single species management issue. This made it
difficult for the ENGOs to draw effective attention to taking a more ecosystem based
approach to the problem and for the both the ENGOS and the industry to effectively
point out the limitations of basing management on single stocks.
Fisheries and fleets
A fishery is an amalgam of fish stocks, fishing gears, fishing fleets and métiers; where
‘fleet’ usually refers to geography and vessel size, ‘métier’ is a term of art for sections of
fleets with similar gears and fishing patterns. DGMARE’s Data Collection Framework
(DCF) defines métiers according to gear classes (e.g. trawls, dredges), gear groups (e.g.
bottom trawls, pelagic trawls), gear types (e.g. bottom otter trawl, bottom pair trawl),
main target species, and net mesh size or other selective devices (Ulrich et al. 2012).
Attempts at effort management beginning in 2003 for cod used days at sea limits that
ignored the DCF and defined métiers in terms of gear type and mesh size. Reforms in 2009,
responding to protests from fishers, led to categories at the level of the Member States over
broader gear/mesh size categories, thus allowing for more flexibility, at least for national
fisheries managers (Ulrich et al. 2012). Vessel size and vessel power are also common bases
for regulation, especially in effort management. These categories are used as the
basis of both science and regulation, defining vessels’ access rights to the fishery.
Discourse analysis
DGMARE must allocate fish among Member States. In MSMFs this means considering
all the different fleets that fish for part of a stock either directly as a target species or
indirectly as bycatch. To try to arrive at an objective way to address this problem
DGMARE turned to the fisheries scientists:
Q7. Commission Fisheries Scientist: We want to reduce fishing mortality for cod. . . .
The approach is to break down of the data from each of the fleets, to separate out
catches of each of the species. Look at the activity of the fleet and then use a sort of
optimisation technique where you put a score on the outcome that you want to have.
DGMARE is looking for a solution that ‘optimises’ the distribution of fishing
quota and effort allocations among the various fleets. The optimisation would
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States. For example, scientists were asked to develop such an optimisation model
for the 20-odd fleets and 60-odd métiers that fish for cod in the North Sea. This
optimisation (Q7) requires precise data on what the fleets are catching (Ulrich
et al. 2012). At the time of these discussions ICES’ position was that the NS cod
stock could not take any fishing pressure and, citing data problems for this com-
plex array of fleets, they were unable to provide DGMARE with advice about how
to fish for other stocks without damaging the cod further (ICES 2003). This reluc-
tance on ICES’ part was not well received. A high-level fisheries manager for a
Member State, in fact, suggested that if ICES would not develop this advice they
needed to find scientists who would.
The North Sea RAC also defines ‘fisheries’ in order to develop LTMPs. The fisheries they
define bear no resemblance to those the defined by the DCF or the allocation models.
Q8. Interviewer: Is defining a fishery a problem? RAC Staff Member: We didn't find
it difficult; actually we defined the five key fisheries for the North Sea without any
difficulty at all. . . . Interviewer: How does this relate to the fleet definitions, that the
Commission uses. RAC Staff Member: Not at all, I mean, we simply, I think sat
down at an executive committee meeting or working group meeting and said: You
know, what the key fisheries that we need to have management plans for, so we, we
re-invented the wheel in that respect, it didn't relate to gear type at all. Interviewer:
Didn't at all? RAC Staff Member: No. Interviewer: So, did the RAC see there is a
problem that all data gathering is based on a different system? RAC Staff Member:
I think it didn't specifically, didn't have its attention specifically drawn to that
particular problem.
Stakeholder recognize that definitions are necessary for both promulgating and ana-
lysing the impacts of management measures, especially as they would like fisheries,
albeit much more broadly defined, to be the units of management. However, the defini-
tions of fleets and métiers used in management are driven by bureaucratic needs for al-
location and data collection rather than by the realities of fishing itself. The imposition
of regulations on a class of vessels makes it much more difficult for a vessel to shift to
another class.
This kind of flexibility was often an issue that came up when we were discussing the
categorisation of boats for management in the fishing ports. Most fishers preferred
categories that were large enough to allow seasonal flexibility. A member of a local fish-
ers’ organisation in Denmark told us:
Q9. It is self-evident that if you have to operate with those “days at sea”, you have to
say that the rules cannot be the same for a trawler and a net boat. Of course they
cannot be the same. But once you've been put into boxes, it is just so difficult to
come and say ‘I would actually like to try and do something different from what I
used to do’. You cannot do that. It's over. If you have not been in Kattegat fishing,
then you will never come into Kattegat fishing.
Another challenge in elaborating this kind of boundary object is that fishers’ behav-
iour, and hence the definitions of fleets and métiers do not remain static. This
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Nor are stocks and fisheries independent categories. A French fisher:
Q10. Here, it is a bit difficult. The métier we do is a function of the fish that pass by
this area. So one year you are going to fish sea bream and there are years when you
will catch hake and other years when you will catch whiting. It is never the same.
One cannot define from one year to another what métier we are going to do, how
many fish we are going to catch.
In Scotland in the 1960's and 1970's there was an explosion in multipurpose boats,
and the fishers would shift according to season. But these days more and more boats
stay with one kind of fishery instead of shifting according to season. The following
quote from a Scottish fisher demonstrates how this is a progressive process as different
kinds of management measures interact with one another:
Q11. In 1999 the boat that I had sunk and I was, it was a sort of crossroad what we
were going to do. I had to build a new boat, and I built the new boat looking at what
I was entitled to catch, what was the best, most efficient way to catch my quota, and
that's what I came up with. So we are getting more and more, the groups are getting
more and more polarised as time goes by, getting more and more difficult to jump. If I
were to say later that I want to catch langoustine, that’s a sort of no go. If I say I'd better
go catch langoustines, I would then have to look at ways for me to exchange my
demersal quota for a langoustine quota, and then I would have the expenses of making
my boat capable of pursuing that split. So when it gets at it, I may not bother.
Some argue that this growing focus of the industry on particular species has reduced
the ecological resilience of the fisheries system by making it difficult for fishers to fish
for one species when another becomes less valuable or more difficult to catch:
Q12. Industry RAC Member: For bureaucratic, management and control reasons
there has, over the years, been a move towards single species fisheries. However, this
reduces the resilience of the fishing industry as the flexibility to change target
species, gear et cetera in response to stock depletion or changing markets is
removed. It is important not to define the fleets and fisheries into artificial categories
that are either unnecessarily restrictive or devoid of meaning.
While fishers will argue that fishing flexibility provides ecological benefit, conserva-
tionists argue that it makes monitoring and controlling of fishing behaviour that much
harder. They are more sympathetic to the industry view when it is part of a broader
shift towards an ecosystem approach:
Q13. Conservation NGO RAC Member: I am an advocate of the ecosystem
approach – which I believe needs to be integrated into the recovery plans if they are
to deliver. The plan should allow, if that's what the industry requires to be viable, the
option to switch between fisheries, provided that the overall take of all species and
individual species is within the limits determined by scientific assessments.
Wilson and Jacobsen Maritime Studies 2013, 12:1 Page 14 of 18
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/12/1/1Not all RAC stakeholders agree that defining fisheries and fleets is even a require-
ment. Indeed, this same advocate of the ecosystem approach believes that if we did put
effective limits on the overall take the general knowledge already held about fishing ac-
tivities would be sufficient.
Defining fisheries and fleets is contentious because these definitions are critical com-
ponents of boundary objects used as rule conditions. The process limited lifeworld ac-
cess for all stakeholders. Defining fisheries for highly complex optimization models
demanded that ICES scientists provide advice that they were reluctant to and some-
times refused to offer. This involved institutional pressure great enough so one
manager expressed a wish for other, more cooperative, advice givers.c This same ap-
proach to fisheries definitions undercuts the ENGOs ability to raise ecosystem issues
effectively. Fishers, both their representatives on the RACs and skippers in ports, have
a much more complex idea of fisheries than are reflected in either modelling or regula-
tions but have no way effectively to include them in discussions where more official
definitions are already established in monitoring, allocation modelling and regulations.
These issues were further clarified using the pile sorts.
Pile sorts
A pile sorting exercise was carried out in all 12 fishing ports (Jacobsen et al. 2009).
Fishers were given the names of local vessels on cards, asked to place them in piles of
similar boats “in any way that makes sense”, and then asked to explain how they made
their category choices. These pile sorts were then used as the basis of a cluster analysis
in order to report general results. Every port used fishing technique, which loosely cor-
responds to the DCF’s “gear group” and boat size as important criteria. All of the main
regulatory and data gathering categories appear in some form in the fishers’ categories
except for mesh size.
The great difference is that fishers recognize many more dimensions than the regula-
tors do. The pile sorts documented thirteen other categories relevant to the fishers with
considerable variation found among the ports. Many categories revolve around fishing
area, broad categories of target species and time and distance from port. Other categories
that appeared included professionalism, processing possibilities on board, a specia-
lized fishery, quota ownership, taxation, cooperation, working alone on board, oil
consumption, environmental impact, fishing intensity, production, and treatment by
management. Conflicts between gear groups, local port rules, and fuel costs were
important determinates of categories in addition to national or EU fishery regula-
tion. In general, fishers’ prefer categories that are large enough to allow seasonal
flexibility while at the being precise enough to appreciate their ways of working.
For example, coastal fisheries exhibit a preference for flexible gear categories over
species categories (Jacobsen et al. 2009).
Conclusion
Both global and European experiences with MSMF suggests that the management of
such fisheries is a dynamic process in which management institutions will need to shift
constantly in the face of changing ecological and bio-economic realities. How, within
these kinds of SES, can resilience be understood and improved? DGMARE’s current
suggestions for reforming the CFP (CEC 2009) suggests that the answer is ‘getting the
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use them as a way to build toward the common good then these institutions are more
resilient. This is the critical insight about resilience that agent-based theories offer.
A communication-based approach provides other sorts of diagnostics for improving SES
resilience. One of the sets of boundary objects we examined increased communicative
resilience because it provided a focus of discussion, but did so by avoiding the discussion of
specific rule conditions. The other set dealt directly with rule conditions and decreased
communicative resilience by creating different sets of categories that limited the raising of
validity claims because only a sub-set of categories could be effectively referenced.
For recovery plans, all four of the main players are in basic agreement. Recovery
plans are needed and they should lead to LTMP based on harvest control rules for the
species involved. The key role the plans played was to create a platform for different
stakeholders to work out a common strategic goal in the midst of their many differences.
Recovery plans were particularly important in the early development of the RACs as
multi-stakeholder management institutions (Wilson 2009b). The abstraction of the
discussion of recovery plans as broad strategies rather than specific rules requiring
defined rule conditions was critical for this. They gave the RACs a way to develop a
shared lifeworld without having to commit to specifics, this reduced each groups
need to interact strategically.
The definitions of fisheries, fleets and métiers are boundary objects that are much
more directly involved in more precise needs for accountability. The discussions were
always already rooted in the definitions of fisheries and métiers found either in the
DCF, in individual effort control regulations or allocation models. This made the dis-
cussion of complexity effectively impossible, even discussions among scientists and
managers came to an impasse as DGMARE’s need for optimizing mixed fishery models
for allocation led to placing demands on scientists they were not ready to meet. Raising
the broader issues of concern to the industry and ENGOs was even less possible. The
growing narrowness of definitions of fleets and métiers in management was seen as a
very serious problem in all of the fishing ports. They have truncated discussion of ac-
tual fishing operations while creating incentives and licensing regulations that directly
inhibit fishers’ ability to change how, where and for what they fish. This is the clearest
link in the case studies between communicative resilience – the ability to raise issues
requiring rich communications – and the overall resilience of the SES, which depends
on adaptive flexibility in respect to the environment. It also illustrates the complemen-
tarity of the agent-based and communicative approaches: the communicative failure
meant an inability to discuss what it meant to “get the incentives right”.
One interesting aspect of comparing the regulatory categories with the fishers’
categories revealed in the pile sorts is the concept of decomposable systems. Simon
(1962) argued that decomposability is a more common characteristic of complex sys-
tems than one would presuppose because of limits on the how many subsystems can
simultaneously interact. Furthermore, and this is the point emphasised by Ostrom
(2007), nearly decomposable systems are also much easier for us to understand.
Ostrom (2007) therefore argues that we need to use tools to decompose SES in order
to arrive at effective and well contextualised diagnoses of complex problems. A corol-
lary of this is a temptation when creating boundary objects to create decompositions
that are driven more by bureaucratic logic and the needs of easy monitoring than by
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of imposed categories that not only oversimplify the local situation but actually change
the local fleets to reflect the imposed and now rigid categories.
Hence a key issue revealed by this linkage of CST with boundary objects is how to
make accountability effective in the midst of complexity. The basic warning is not to
seek accountability through the simplification of reality in ways that create black boxes
beyond effective questions and caveats. The classic way to approach the question of
downward accountability is the development of nested institutions where decisions are
made at the lowest feasible level as defined by ecological processes (Ostrom 1990). This
is a useful standard approach but it does not answer the question of how to develop
boundary objects for effective accountability for which sufficient lifeworld resources are
available to handle complexity. CST suggests that these boundary objects must be sim-
ple in a specific way: they must allow effective transparency and direct accountability
while avoiding limits to lifeworld access that undercut the boundary objects.
One example of such a system is “results-based” fisheries management (Ulrich et al.
2012), which takes various forms but which emphasizes small scale self-management
initiatives characterized by simple but rigorous accountability based on demonstration
by fishers that specific, measurable limits on ecological impacts have been honoured
while not imposing any further rule conditions on fishing operations. The boundary ob-
ject of interest is a contract that specifies how the fisheries rights holders will
demonstrate compliance with limits. The sector management being adopted in New
England approaches this form, although requirements for contracts still involve
attempts at operational control (NOAA 2009). Similar ideas are being implemented in
Australia, Canada and some coastal fisheries in Europe, often in conjunction with
transferable access rights.
Communicative and strategic actions within institutions are linked, but each has its
own logic. Where this linkage is clearest is in the need to develop science policy boundary
objects that are transparent and allow effective rule conditions. SES resilience is as much a
function of what we have called communicative resilience as it is of strategic action in re-
sponse to the right incentives. The analysis presented here suggests that considering both
types of action, and the systems for objectivity/transparency and accountability that lubri-
cate them, may allow us to get a fuller and more systematic picture of resilience within
complex SES.Endnotes
aThe term “power” is the translation found in Habermas (1987) for what we think is
more clearly expressed as “authority” as Habermas links the concept to offices.
bSince this research was carried out the European Parliament has been given a “co-
decision” making role in fisheries.
cThis is not a realistic desire. ICES’ independence is protected by the fact that it also
provides advice to Norway, Russia and Iceland with whom the EU negotiates over
shared stocks. These countries would strongly resist the EU replacing ICES with an-
other source of official advice.Competing interests
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